Using Social Choice Function Vs. Social Welfare Function To Aggregate Individual Preferences In Group Decision Support Systems by Nguyen, Dat-Dao
International Journal of Management & Information Systems – Third Quarter 2014 Volume 18, Number 3 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 167 The Clute Institute 
Using Social Choice Function Vs. Social 
Welfare Function To Aggregate 
Individual Preferences In Group 
Decision Support Systems 
Dat-Dao Nguyen, California State University, Northridge, USA 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In multi-criteria decision making, any Group Decision Support System (GDSS) requires a “social 
judgment model” for calculation of weights on decision alternatives, and tabulation of individual 
votes toward a consensus. One could assess a Social Welfare Function - such as Keeney’s - to 
aggregate individual cardinal preferences or utilities into a group preference. Alternatively, one 
could use Social Choice Functions - such as Condorcet, Borda, Copeland, and Eigenvector - to 
aggregate individual ordinal preferences or rankings into a group ranking. This study empirically 
investigates the consensus between individual preferences and the group preference derived from 
various aggregation methods. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
ny Group Decision Support System (GDSS) requires a “social judgment model” for calculation of 
weights for decision alternatives, and tabulation of individual votes toward a consensus in a multi-
criteria decision making setting (DeSanctis et al., 2008; Turban et al., 2011). One can achieve such 
consensus with a social welfare function – a group utility function (Keeney & Kirkwoods, 1975; Keeney, 1976) to 
aggregate individual cardinal preferences or utilities into a group preference. The difficulty is in assessing the 
weights of individual judgments and trade-offs among individual utilities. An alternative is to aggregate individual 
ordinal preferences, or rankings, into a group ranking with social choice functions such as Condorcet, Borda, etc … 
(Richelson, 1975, 1978a, 1978b, 1981) to count the votes of group members. 
 
This study empirically investigates the consensus between individual preferences and the group preference 
derived from various aggregation methods. It highlights a comprehensive rule for the effective aggregation of 
individual preferences into a high group consensus. 
 
SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTION APPROACH FOR GROUP PREFERENCE 
 
A social welfare function aggregates individual preferences into a group preference. Keeney and 
Kirkwoods (1975) and Keeney (1976) proposed that a group is an entity whose decisions obey the axioms of utility 
theory, then they formulated a group cardinal utility function. 
 
For each alternative aj, j = 1, 2, ... , m, there exists an individual cardinal utility ui(aj) for individual Ii, i = 1, 
2, ... , n.  These individual utilities could be assessed by a procedure described in Keeney (1977). 
 
Then the group cardinal utility for alternative aj is: 
 
uG = u(u1, u2, ... ,un) (1) 
A 
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This function could be in additive form: 
 
uG = 
n
i=1 kiui  (2) 
 
or in multiplicative form: 
 
1 + kuG = 
n
i=1 [1 + kkiui] (3) 
 
where k and ki are scaling constants with 0 < ki < 1 ; k > -1 is a non zero constant and is the solution to: 
 
1 + k = ni=1 [1 + kki] (4) 
 
ki can be interpreted as the weight for individual utility. It is the marginal rate of trade-off in individual utility to 
increase the utility of other members. The sign of k implies whether individual utilities are substitute or 
complementary. 
 
The process requires interpersonal comparisons of utilities by a benevolent dictator or by a participatory 
group (Keeney & Kirkwoods, 1975; Keeney, 1976). The benevolent dictator – someone has responsibility for the 
decision but wishing to take into account the views of others – assesses and decides on the weights of individual 
utilities (Keeney, 1976). In a participatory group, all members agree upon an aggregation rule for selecting the best 
alternative. 
 
Preference is a highly individual matter as people may differ considerably in their judgments and 
expressions. Consequently, a group utility should be an aggregation of individual utilities/preferences based on a 
specified aggregating rule rather than a direct assessment of collective judgment (Wallsten & Budescu, 1983). 
 
The trade-offs of individual utilities require the interpersonal comparisons of utilities and the relative 
weights given to individual preferences. This process involves political issues, even ethical issues, in distributing 
power to group members. One also has the difficulty in deciding whether the model should be additive or 
multiplicative; i.e., whether individual utilities are substitute or complementary. Then trade-offs among member 
weights have to be reassessed when the group changes its members. 
 
In a group decision, one may not expect the consensus on value or utility of each element of the decision 
problem. There is a distinction between consensus of values and consensus of choices. Achieving unanimity on 
values of attributes is not expected and it is usually not necessary for members to agree on some choices of 
alternatives (Ben-Arieh & Easton, 2007). 
 
SOCIAL CHOICE FUNCTION APPROACH FOR GROUP PREFERENCE 
 
A comprehensive alternative is to derive a group ranking based on individual rankings/ordinal preferences. 
This social choice function approach uses a counting rule to aggregate individual ranking of alternatives/candidates 
or individual votes into a group ranking (Richelson, 1975, 1978a, 1978b, 1981.) 
 
A voting procedure can be differentiated into either a non-ranked or a preferential system (Hwang & Lin, 
1987). In non-ranked or spot voting, a decision maker specifies only the most desirable candidate. Since opinions on 
the respective merits of other candidates are not given, this judgment set is incomplete. In preferential voting, the 
decision maker indicates the order of preference in which he/she would place all the candidates. 
 
The study reported herein experiments with preferential voting process and the aggregation of individual 
rankings of candidates into a group choice using social choice functions. 
 
Define: 
 
 x > y as x is preferred to y; 
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 #(i: x >i y) as the number of members who preferred x to y; 
 y  A/{x} as y is belonging to the set of alternatives A in which x is excludes from A 
 
Condorcet Function: 
 
fC = min #(i: x >i y) y  A/{x} (5) 
 
This function measures the lowest number of votes in favor of against any other candidate. The Condorcet 
function elects the candidate having the largest minimum votes against the others 
 
Borda Function: 
 
fB =  #(i: x >i y) y  A (6) 
 
The Borda score of a candidate x is equivalent to the total number of group members who have x preferred 
to y for all y in the set of alternatives under consideration. The candidate with the highest Borda score is the winner. 
 
Copeland Function: 
 
fCP = #(y: y  A AND x > y)  #(y: y  A AND y > x) (7) 
 
This function measures the number of candidates in A that x has a strict simple majority over, minus the 
number of candidates in A who have strict simple majority over x.  The candidates are ranked according to the value 
of fCP. 
 
Eigenvector Function: 
 
Let xi, xj  A and nij be the number of voters that have the alternative xi preferred to the alternative xj. Let D 
be a pairwise comparison matrix with elements defined as follows: 
 
dij = (nij / nji) i  j  ;  dji = 1 / dij  i  j  ; dii= 1 
 
The element dij shows the relative strength of preference for each pair of alternatives. This is a reciprocal 
matrix having all positive values.  The eigenvector associated with the largest positive eigenvalue of matrix D will 
give the relative preference that the group assigned to each alternative. 
 
A group ranking based on ordinal preferences may produce ties. In this case, one has to use linear 
programming techniques, such as “Minimum Variance” (Cook & Seiford, 1982), to derive a compromised solution. 
However, the social preference ordering will not contain any tie if the number of voters is odd and voters are nor 
allowed to express indifference. In case of intransitivity, another subsidiary principle is needed to get a solution from 
the cycles; e.g., “Game-Theoretic Procedure” (Felsenthal & Machover, 1992). In fact, these authors also noted that a 
considerably lower prevalence of cycles was found in empirical investigations than being predicted in theoretical 
studies. 
 
MEASURE OF GROUP CONSENSUS  
 
The group consensus is measured with the Kemeny function (Kemeny & Snell, 1962.) This function is 
classified as an eminently fair, reasonable social choice function among top satisfactory functions with respect to 
conditions proposed in the literature (Levenglick, 1975; Richelson, 1981.) The Kemeny function finds the maximum 
total amount of agreement or similarity between the consensus ranking and individual preference orderings on the 
set of alternatives A. 
 
Let a group of n members rank a set of m alternatives. 
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Definition 1: Let L = (lij) be the ranking matrix. The element lij can take the following values: 1 if ai > aj; 0 
if ai ~ aj; -1 if ai < aj.; where i,j = 1,2, …, m is the index of alternative a1, a2, …, am. This matrix L is derived from 
any possible linear order of A, for example, the order obtained from a particular social choice function under 
investigation. 
 
Definition 2: Let mij be the number of members preferring ai to aj; mji be the number of members preferring 
aj to ai; m
*
ij be the number of members being indifferent between ai and aj. Then M is a proportion matrix whose 
elements represent the proportion of voters preferring one alternative to the other: 
 
Mij = (mij + m
*
ij) / n; Mij = ½ i   j 
 
Definition 3: Let E = (eij) be a translated election matrix, E = M – M
T 
, where M
T
 is the transpose of M. 
The element eij represents the difference between the proportion of voters preferring ai to aj and those preferring aj 
to ai. 
 
Then the Kemeny function is defined to be: 
 
fK = max <E, L> (8) 
 
where <E, L> is the ordinary inner product of E and L; i.e., ij lijeij 
 
From many possible group ranking of alternatives, a particular group ranking is said to maximize the 
amount of agreements among group members when its Kemeny score; i.e., the value of <E, L>, is the largest. 
 
AGGREGATION OF INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES 
 
The Decision Problem 
 
The decision problem relates to project selection and economic appraisal of proposals for new products in a 
manufacturing company by a Board of Directors having nine members. The decision problem (choice set) is 
presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Decision Problem  
 Project 1 Project 2 Project 3 Project 4 Project 5 
-NPV of Cash Flow (in millions) 
-Initial Investment  (in millions) 
-Market Growth Rate   
-Capability to Market  
-Prospect of Technical Success    
$3.5 
$1.5 
Fair 
Good 
Fair 
$5.0 
$3.0 
V.good 
Fair 
Fair 
$1.5 
$0.5 
Good 
V.good 
V.good 
$4.0 
$2.0 
Good 
Good 
Good 
$2.5 
1.0 
V.good 
V.good 
good 
 
There exist tradeoffs among criteria and no single criterion absolutely dominates any others. The proposals 
are rated on a scale from 0 to 100, individually by nine board members. Individual preferences/utilities on each 
proposal were assessed with a procedure described in Keeney (1977). Then group rankings were aggregated from 
individual preferences/rankings from members. Table 2 presents the preference order of the choice set by group 
members. 
 
Table 2: Preference Orders of 5 Projects by Group Members 
Member 1 P3 > P5 > P4 > P2 > P1 
Member 2 P3 > P5 > P4 > P2 > P1 
Member 3 P3 > P5 > P2 > P4 > P1 
Member 4 P5 > P3 > P4 > P2 > P1 
Member 5 P5 > P3 > P4 > P1 > P2 
Member 6 P5 > P4 > P3 > P1 > P2 
Member 7 P5 > P3 > P4 > P1 > P2 
Member 8 P2 > P5 > P4 > P3 > P1 
Member 9 P4 > P2 > P5 > P3 > P1 
 
International Journal of Management & Information Systems – Third Quarter 2014 Volume 18, Number 3 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 171 The Clute Institute 
Findings and Discussion 
 
Assuming equal member weights/powers, one can take either arithmetic mean or geometric mean of 
individual utilities for each project to derive at a group utility. The former rule averages out differences in individual 
preferences among group members. The later rule, called the Nash bargaining model, maximizes the product of 
individual utilities for each project over a “status quo”; i.e., a project with all being at worst. 
 
Using the social welfare approach with arithmetic means to average individual utilities/preferences, the 
study arrived at the following group rankings. 
 
P5  >  P3  >  P4  >  P2  >  P1 
 
Using the social choice function approach, one arrived at the following rankings: 
 
Condorcet Function Ranking: fC(P5) > fC(P3) > fC(P2) > fC(P4) > fC(P1) 
                
Borda Function Ranking: fB(P5) > fB(P3) > fB(P4) > fB(P2) > fB(P1) 
              
Copeland Function Ranking: fCP(P5) > fCP(P3) > fCP(P4) > fCP(P2) > fCP(P1) 
              
Eigenvector Function Ranking: fE(P5) > fE(P3) > fE(P4) > fE(P2) > fE(P1) 
 
Scores and ranks of the choice set are presented in Table 3. Function scores are reported in the brackets. 
Kemeny scores for group ranking are calculated at the end of the table. 
 
Table 3: Group Utility vs. Social Choice Functions Scores and Ranks 
 Group Utility Condorcet Borda Copeland Eigenvector 
Project 1 (.503)  5 (0)   5 (3)    5 (-4)   5 (.030)   5 
Project 2 (.570)  4 (2)   3 (12)  4 (-2)   4 (.071)   4 
Project 3 (.741)  2 (3)   2 (25)  2 (2)    2 (.241)   2 
Project 4 (.652)  3 (1)   4 (20)  3 (0)    3 (.156)   3 
Project 5 (.763)  1 (6)   1 (30)  1 (3)    1 (.502)   1 
Kemeny (116/9) (96/9) (116/9) (116/9) (116/9) 
 
Results show that social choice functions produce similar group ranking from those obtained with social 
welfare functions. This implies that one may not need complex assessment methods for cardinal preferences of 
social welfare approach. Even the implementation of complex counting rules such as the Eigenvector function may 
not be necessary. 
 
This study is based on the assumptions of equal weights among group members. However, member weights 
- voting powers - could be incorporated in the social choice function. Instead of assessing utility tradeoffs among 
group members, a group can easily decide on the number of extra votes for some key members. For example, in this 
study, the group may agree that Member A can cast two votes. Then, the group will function as if there are ten 
members and the aggregation process will account for two duplicate rankings from Member A. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study finds the similarity among social choice functions and the comparable performance of the 
simple function against the complex ones. It empirically confirms the ability on Copeland function as a simple and 
accurate aggregation rule for a Group Decision Support System. 
 
This study works on the individual preference assessed by cardinal utility function with a procedure 
described in Keeney (1977). Elsewhere we discuss evidences supporting a holistic preference approach as an 
alternative to utility-based assessment to overcome the difficulty of decision makers in expressing explicitly their 
decision rules and their heuristics in the preference assessment process. 
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